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Abstract
The light-emitting diode(LED) is widely used as an indicator on the information device. Early in 2002,
Loughry et al studied the exfiltration of LED indicators[16] and found the kind of LEDs unmodulated to
indicate some state of the device can hardly be utilized to establish covert channels. In our paper, a novel
approach is proposed to modulate this kind of LEDs. We use binary frequency shift keying(B-FSK) to
replace on-off keying(OOK) in modulation. In order to verify the validity, we implement a prototype
of an exfiltration malware. Our experiment show a great improvement in the imperceptibility of covert
communication. It is available to leak data covertly from air-gapped networks via unmodulated LED
status indicators.
Keywords: Air-gapped Networks; Covert Channel; Light-Emitting Diode; LED indicator;
Modulation
I Introduction
The covert channel is a well-known way to trans-
mit messages by circumventing the security mech-
anism. The definition of covert channel was given
by Lampson in 1973 to describe the leakage of data
by abuse of shared resource by the processes in dif-
ferent privilege levels[12]. With the development
of communication technology, the border of covert
channel had been extended from one-host to net-
works. There are many kinds of cover channel de-
veloped in past twenty years. Zander et al surveyed
the network covert channels in different kinds of
networks protocols[31]. In order to maintain the
security, physical isolation is applied in almost ev-
ery top-secret organization to keep the networks
with high level separated from the less secure and
public networks. The term of this type of isola-
tion is air-gapped. Is the air-gapped networks safe
enough then? No. A lot of methods were pro-
posed to breach the air-gapped networks in the last
ten years. Generally saying, there are four kinds
of covert channel to bridge the air gap: Electro-
magnetic covert channels, Acoustic covert channels,
Thermal covert channels and Optical covert chan-
nels.
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Kuhn and Anderson proposed firstly the
method[11] to transmit information covertly using
electromagnetic radiation in 1998. Guri et al intro-
duced AirHopper[3], a type of malware, leak data
between a mobile phone and a computer nearby us-
ing FM radio module in 2014. Guri et al introduced
a malware named GSMem[2], which leak data via
electromagnetic radiation generated by the bus of
computer memory in 2015. Guri et al proposed
USBee[4], which can be used to leak data via elec-
tromagnetic radiation generated by the USB cable
in 2016. In 2016, Matyunin et al used the mag-
netic field sensor in mobile device to build a covert
channel.
In 2013, Hanspach and Goetz used the acous-
tical devices: speakers and microphones of the
notebook computer to build a covert channel[10].
Malley et al[21] introduced a covert communica-
tion over inaudible sounds in 2014. Lee et al[13]
uses a loud-speaker as an acoustical input device,
and make a speaker-to-speaker covert channel in
2015. Guri et al introduced Fansmitter[6] and
DiskFiltration[7], new methods to send acoustic
signals without speakers in 2016.
In 2015, Guri et al introduced BitWhisper[5], to
build a unique bidirectional thermal covert channel
via the heat radiated with another adjacent PC. In
2017, Mirsky et al proposed HVACKer[18], to build
a one-way thermal covert channel from an air con-
ditioning system to an air-gapped network. The
thermal covert channels in the multi-cores CPU is
researched as follows. Mast built a thermal covert
channel in multi-cores[17] with a transmit rate of
12.5bits per second in 2015. Bartolini studied
the capacity of a thermal covert channel in multi-
cores[1] in 2016. Selber propose UnCovert3[22], a
new thermal covert channel in multi-cores with a
transmit rate of 20 bits per second in 2017.
The optical covert channels are mostly utilized.
Shamir present a cover channel to breach an air-
gapped network [24] by a light-based printer in
2014. Lopes and Aranha proposed a malicious
device[15] to leak data via its flickering infrared
LEDs. In 2016, Guri introduced VisiSploit[], a pro-
totype to leak date via an invisible QR-code in LCD
screen.
Loughry and Umphres studied the exfiltration
via LED indicators[16] in 2002. They divided LED
indicators into three classes:
Class I The unmodulated LEDs used to indicate
some state of the device.
Class II The time-modulated LEDs correlated
with the activity level of the device.
Class III The modulated LEDs that are strongly
correlated with the content of data being pro-
cessed.
They found that TD LED indicators on almost ev-
ery modem of those years belong to Class III. Even
a LED indicator on a DES encryptor leaks plain
data. They indicated that although the LEDs in
Class II are not so dangerous as those in Class III,
but they can be modulated to leak significant sig-
nal, and can be used to build covert channels.
Sepetnitsky proposed a covert channel prototype
[23] of leaking data to the camera in a smart phone
via the monitor’s power status LED indicator in
2014. Guri presented LED-it-GO[9], to leak data
via hard drive LED indicator in 2017. Guri also
proposed xLED[8], to leak data via status LED in-
dicators on the routers in 2017.
In Guri’s two methods, LED-it-GO and xLED,
the LEDs that used as the light source belong to
Class II. They flickers naturally without causing
user’s suspicion. Nevertheless, Sepetnitsky’s pro-
totype might be not so good to cope with the be-
havior covertness of covert channel. Because the
LED indicator he used belongs to Class I. Unfortu-
nately, the fastest flicker frequency of the monitor
power LED is 25Hz. It is hard to circumvent hu-
man sense of sight if some data is modulated with
OOK at that frequency.
In our paper, a novel approach is proposed to
modulate the LEDs in Class I. We give a pro-
totype, KLONC(the abbreviation of “Keyboard’s
LED tO Network Camera”), to build an optical
covert channel and to leak data from air-gapped
network to an IP camera via the LED status indi-
cator on the keyboard of a PC. In 2002, Loughry et
al presented an exfiltration via keyboard LED in-
dicators in Appendix A[16]. The flicker frequency
was up to 150Hz in Solaris OS. Unlikely, because
of the limitation of Windows 10, the ordinary user-
leveled program can make the keyboard LED indi-
cators flicker at 33Hz only by simulation of striking
the keyboard. In our experiment, we noted that hu-
man vision can hardly distinguish two flickers with
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different frequencies on a LED lighting on continu-
ously. Then, we use B-FSK to modulate the data.
Two different flicker frequencies are utilized to en-
code logical ’1’ and ’0’. The result of experiment
shows that the effect of covertness is achieved. Our
approach can be used in the optical covert channels
via LED indicators in Class I at a low flicker fre-
quency. Especially, Sepetnitsky’s prototype[23] can
use our approach by replace OOK into B-FSK on
their modulation. Comparing with our prototype,
Sepetnitsky’s prototype has more advantages, such
as a nearer distance from the LED indicator to the
camera and a higher frame rate of camera up to
60fps.
The contributions of our research are as follows:
1. It is difficult to build an available covert chan-
nel via the unmodulated LED status indicator.
We proposed a novel approach on modulation
form and presented a prototype to leak data
from air-gapped network to an IP camera via
the keyboard LED indicator.
2. A household IP camera with ordinary config-
uration is utilized to achieve the covert signal
steadily in our experiment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Background technology is given in Section II. A
prototype, KLONC, is proposed in Section III. Sec-
tion IV presents results and evaluations. Counter-
measures are given in Section V, and we draw our
conclusions in Section VI.
II Background Technology
A LED
A light-emitting diode (LED) is a two-lead semi-
conductor light source. It is a p-n junction diode
that emits light when activated. When a suitable
voltage is applied to the leads, electrons are able
to recombine with electron holes within the device,
releasing energy in the form of photons. [29]
Most keyboards equip with three LED indica-
tors recently. They are NumLock, CapsLock and
ScrollLock arranged horizontally in the upper right
corner of font panel.
Sensitive information
LED indicator status
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.mp4 file
YUV Data
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Restored sensitive information
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Extracting
LED Demodulating
Figure 1: Flow diagram of KLONC
B IP camera
An IP camera[28], also called a network surveil-
lance camera, is a new type of camera which can
access Internet. The user can control it by manip-
ulating a client panel remotely. With development
of the technology of optics , video coding and net-
works, the configuration of IP camera has upgraded
rapidly. MPEG4 coding algorithm with h.264 stan-
dard is applied to cope with the high resolution up
to 720P(1280x720) or 1080P(1920x1080). Nowa-
days, IP camera is widely used in normal life.
III Attack Model
An attack model named KLONC, is proposed in
this section. In the model, we suppose that the IP
camera is compromised by an attacker. And the
LED indicators on a keyboard of an air-gapped PC
are in the camera’s line of sight. We also suppose
that a malware that controls the LEDs is prein-
stalled on the PC.
As shown in Figure 1, the sensitive information,
such as credit card number, password, encryption
key etc, exfiltrates via the LED indicator of the
keyboard on the desk of an office cuibicle. The op-
tical signal is fetched by an IP camera hung on the
ceiling of the office. An optical covert channel is
build between the LED indicator and the IP cam-
era. Then, the attacker access the IP camera via
Internet by manipulating the client panel of the IP
camera with ID and password gotten forehand. A
.mp4 video file is obtained by attacker. The YUV
data of the LED indicator is gotten after decod-
ing the video file. By demodulating the brightness
values, the sensitive information is restored.
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A Modulation and Encoding
A normal method to leak messages is to turn the
three LED indicators on/off on a keyboard. Then,
the optical signals can be adopted by some type of
acquisition equipment.
We can control those LEDs by keybd event()
function[20] in Windows API. The function synthe-
sizes a keystroke. A hardware scan code is needed
for the key. VK NUMLOCK is the code for the key
NumLock, and VK CAPITAL or VK SCROLL for
the key CapsLock or ScrollLock. GetKeyState()
function[19] can be use to judge the LED’s status.
It returns 0 while LED turns off; It returns 1 while
LED turns on. The function can be used to record
LEDs’ initial status to recovery their status after
the covert signal transmitting.
The advantage of the method is threefold: A
good compatibility for different Windows versions;
Supporting both PS/2 and USB interfaces; No ad-
ministrator privilege is required. The disadvantage
is that the lock status of a LED indicator is changed
while it is being turned on/off. Hence a interfer-
ence would be made when the user is typing in the
meantime. Because this method on typing simula-
tion is to send data into the keyboard buffer, reac-
tion speed of LED indicators can be increased by
modifying Registry keys for Windows.[26]
For Linux OS, there are two methods to turn the
LED indicators on/off. The command setleds can
turn them on/off without changing their lock sta-
tuses. But an administrator privilege is required.
On the contrary, The command xset and numlockx
can turn them on/off without any administrator
privilege. But they change the lock statuses of the
LEDs.
On modulation, the simplest form of a common
modulation is On-Off Keying(OOK). We can use
the presence of a signal(LED-ON) to encode a log-
ical zero(0), and use the absence of a signal(LED-
OFF) to encode a logical one(1).
Logical Bit LED Status
0 LED-ON
1 LED-OFF
The OOK can be used for the transmission with
high carrier frequency. When the frequency is up
to 150Hz[16], people can never find any flicker.
But it is not available with low carrier frequency.
More unfortunately, the frame rate of an IP cam-
Figure 2: Frequency Simulations for B-FSK
era is 15fps(Frames Per Second) at most. So we
found a new form of signal modulation which is
more suitable to transmit optical signal to a low-
frequency acquisition equipment with a high covert-
ness against human eyes.
In our approach, we use Binary Frequency Shift
Keying(B-FSK) to modulate the signal. We can use
one flicker frequency f0 to encode a logical zero(0),
and use another flicker frequency f1 to encode a
logical one(1).
Logical Bit Flicker Frequency
0 f0
1 f1
Because there are only two discrete states on the
brightness of a LED indicator, a novel method is
proposed to simulate flicker frequencies on B-FSK.
The method is described in Figure 2.
In Condition (a) of Figure 2, the LED is always
being on, no flicker exists. Supposing the change
rate is 30 times per second. So the flicker fre-
quency f = 0(No change happened), the brightness
B = 30(the sum of turn-on blocks), the flicker value
f(the index to estimate human vision of flicker) is
0.
We define the flicker value f by the following
formula to express the feeling of flicker.
f =
D2
off
Don
Where, Doff is the average length of the runs of
turn-off block, Don is the average length of the runs
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Table 1: YUV420 sample
Y11U11V11 Y12U11V11 Y13U12V12 Y14U12V12 · · ·
Y21U11V11 Y22U11V11 Y23U12V12 Y24U12V12 · · ·
Y31U21V21 Y32U21V21 Y33U22V22 Y34U22V22 · · ·
Y41U21V21 Y42U21V21 Y43U22V22 Y44U22V22 · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
of turn-on block. Obviously the Condition (e) is not
good for covertness. It is the reason why OOK is
not suitable to be a modulation form here. When
a long runs of 1 follow a long runs of 0, the flicker
value of the LEDs would be too high. The user
would become aware of it.
The optical signal emitted from the LED is re-
ceived by an IP camera. The video data are stored
in a TF card inserted in the camera encoded by
H.264 standard[25].
B Decoding and Demodulation
We can use the famous free software FFmpeg to
convert the .mp4 video file into a .rgb video file
with a command as follow.
ffmpeg -i input.mp4 -vcodec
rawvideo -pix fmt rgb24 -an
output.rgb
But this method is not wise for the .rgb file will
be too large. So we deal with the .mp4 file with
following steps:
Firstly, the video data encoded by H.264 stan-
dard will be extracted from the .mp4 file.
ffmpeg -i input.mp4 -f h264
output.264
Secondly, the H.264 video will be decoded into
YUV format data frame by frame. By referring to
Lei’s code[14], we finished this step by making a C
code with FFmpeg’s avcodec library.
Finally, pixel values of the LED indicator will
be acquired from the YUV data by its fixed posi-
tion(row and column) in the frame. There are three
sample modes of YUV data: YUV444, YUV422
and YUV420. Take YUV420 for example, every
pixel has a unique Y value, and four adjacent pixels
share a set of U value and V value as shown in the
Table 1. So when the width of the frame is w, the
pixel (n,m)’s offset in Y sequence is (m−1)×w+n.
And the offsets in U and V sequences are both
(⌊m+1
2
⌋ − 1)× w
2
+ ⌊n+1
2
⌋.
As we mentioned on modulation, B-FSK is used
as the modulation form. So naturally, we can de-
modulate the data by distinguishing two different
frequencies.
In addition, we can calculate the mean value and
the variance of the data. Because the every condi-
tion of Figure 2 has a B value, the index value of
brightness, the mean value of Y value in data can
be calculated to distinguish two different B values.
The variance of Y value in data can also represents
the dither degree of the signal. It can be used to
demodulate the data too.
C Effective Distance
The effective distance is an essential index of a cam-
era to fetch the optical signal of LED indicators.
The ability of a camera is determined by its frame
resolution and sensitivity of its electronics. So, on
distances, there is an upper bound to obtain the
message availably for a certain camera. Three fac-
tors influence the upper bound of effective distance.
They are:
1. Ambient Brightness;
2. Emitting Angle of a LED indicator;
3. Distance between the LED indicator and the
camera
C.1 Ambient Brightness
LED indicators are only used to represent the sta-
tuses of a keyboard, so the brightness of a LED
indicator is always weak. When ambient bright-
ness is too high, the brightness status of a LED
can hardly be distinguished in video. On the con-
trary, When ambient brightness is low enough, the
status of a LED is quite obvious in video.
Nevertheless, in our experiments, we find that
when the camera is close to the keyboard, a certain
intensity of ambient brightness can reduce the noise
in MPEG-4 video, the capacity of the channel is
increased instead.
C.2 Relationship between Emitting Angle
and Distance
The emitting angle of a LED indicator is de-
fined here as an angel of the direction of LED’s
emitting and the direction of the camera.
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Figure 3: Relationship between Emitting Angle
and Distance
IP cameras are always hung on the ceiling. The
distance between the desktop and the ceiling is con-
stant. So, the longer the distance from LED indi-
cator to camera, the bigger the emitting angle, the
weaker the intensity of signal obtained. The re-
lationship between the emitting angle and the dis-
tance is described in Figure 3. Where, 6 UZX is the
angle between keyboard surface and desktop. Ac-
cording to the feet’s status of keyboard, the 6 UZX
has two fixed value. Taking Logitech K120 as an
example, the values of 6 UZX are 1.1353328◦ and
6.9474259◦.
In general, LED’s emitting direction is perpen-
dicular to the surface of keyboard. That is XB ⊥
XZ, then 6 UZX = 6 AUB. Suppose J is an arbi-
trary plot on the line AF, then we can get a rela-
tional expression between the emitting angle and
the distance as follow.
6 JXB = arccos
(
|XA|
|XJ|
)
− 6 UZX
Where, 6 UZX = 6 AUB is known, and |XA| can be
measured.
We can also determine the value of LED’s visual
angle in camera, and the value of LED’s effective
shine area in the projection plane.
C.3 Relationship between Distance and
Brightness
Because |OY||ON| ≈ 1000, it means that
6 HOY =
arccos
(
|ON|
2|OY|
)
is approximated with 90◦. So, a
simplified model is described in Figure 4. In the fig-
ure, Plot O is one side of the LED indicator. Plot
Figure 4: Relationship between Emitting Angle
and Effective Shine Area
N is the other side. Changing with the emitting
angle from 0◦ to 90◦, N moves on the Arc GH. Plot
K is N’s projection on the camera direction. Then
|KO| can be represent the value of LED’s effective
shine area in the projection plane. We can get a re-
lational expression between the emitting angle and
the effective shine area as follow.
|KO| = |ON| cos(6 HON)
Where, 6 HON is equal to the emitting angle.
Furthermore, the brightness in the video is not
only related with the effective shine area, but also
with the distance between LED indicator and cam-
era. Then, the relational expression between the
brightness and its influence factors is:
B = β
|ON| cos(6 HON)(
|OY|
y
)2
Where, β is a constant coefficient, y is an initial
reference distance, a non-zero value. |ON| is the
length of LED indicator in the direction of change.
D Channel Capacity
According to Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem,
if the sampling frequency of the receiver is f , the
maximum carrier frequency would be f
2
. The frame
rate of most normal camera in current market is
25fps(frames per second). It means an upper bound
of transmitting speed. The frame rate of some
high end camera can be 60fps or higher. But high
frame rate and high resolution are interacted on
each other. For example, the frame rate of most IP
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camera is 25fps in 720P, but 15fps in 1080P. Aim-
ing at surveillance for security, there is no tend to
increase the frame rate of IP camera.
E Covertness
According to the persistence of vision[30], a single
slight change in 50ms(microsecond) is not sensitive
to human vision. This feature can help us to hide
a turn-off behavior in 40ms on a LED indicator al-
ways being on. For mankind, the maximal fusion
frequency can be up to 60Hz at very high illumi-
nation intensities [27].By conducting experiments,
we find that a turn-off behavior in 20ms can hardly
is observed even the LED is stared continuously.
When the duration of the turn-off behavior is in
20ms to 50ms, a tiny dithering on the brightness of
LED can be observed under a careful observation.
Moreover, the covertness of three LED indicators
on the keyboard are different. To normal computer
users, they would suspect something wrong with
their computers when they notice that a LED in-
dicator turns on without any sake, even when they
find any tiny flash on the brightness of a LED. So
our only choice is to select the LED indicator al-
ways being on to leak data covertly.
Among three LED indicators, NumLock is al-
ways on after a booting of Windows on most com-
puters. Hence NumLock is most suitable to leak
covert message, unless on the computers in depart-
ment of finance where the number pads will be
served all the time. ScrollLock is another suitable
one actually for its function is too old to current
OSes. If ScrollLock could keep being on from the
booting of Windows, it would not catch the atten-
tion of the user. On the contrary, the function of
CapsLock is alway used by every user to input text
message such as ID, password etc. So it would make
user anxious when the turn-on CapsLock is seen.
IV Results and Evaluations
A Experiment Setting
An open-plan office is served as the experimental
environment. It is a common environment for most
business companies and research organizations etc.
The keyboard that leaks data is located on the desk
of an office cubicle. The IP camera is hung on the
Figure 5: Survey Sheet of Experimental Environ-
ment
ceiling of the office. A survey sheet of the experi-
mental environment is shown in Figure 5.
The configuration lists of Personal Computer and
IP camera are shown in Table 2 and Table 3.
B Results
Several experiments were conducted with differ-
ent distances and various ambient brightness. Ob-
tained BERs(Bit Error Rates) of the covert channel
KLONC are listed in Table 4. The table shows that
BERs increase with the distances, but are not linear
relationships with the ambient brightness. When
the distance is 2.54m, most of BERs are less than
10%. When the distance is 3.27m, most of BERs
are less than 25%. But we can see all BERs are
greater than 33% while the distance reaches 5 me-
ters.
According to the channel capacity formula in In-
formation Theory:
C = 1−H(p) = 1 + p log(p) + (1− p) log(1 − p)
we know that when p = 1
3
, the capacity C =
0.081704166 < 1
12
. It means that we need more
than 12 bits data to transmit 1 bit information cor-
rectly. It is impossible to build a reliable channel
under such a condition. So, the distance 5 meters
can be considered as an upper bound of effective
distance to build a covert channel with current ex-
perimental devices.
In our experiments, 6 UZX = 6.9474259◦(the an-
gle between keyboard surface and desktop) and
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Table 2: Configuration of Personal Computer
Module Configuration
CPU Intel Core i5-4590 CPU 3.30GHz
Motherboard ASUS B85-PLUS R2.0
RAM 8GB
Hard Disk SEAGATE Desktop HDD 500G
Keyboard Logitech K120 HID USB
OS Windows 10 Chinese Simplified Version 64-bit (10.0, Build 14393)
Table 3: Configuration of IP Camera
Module Configuration
Resolution 1920x1080 and 640x352
Video Encoding H264MANINPROFLE, JPEG Snapshot
Wireless Network IEEE 802.11b/g/n 2.4GHz
Focus 5 times optical zoom, 3.6-12mm
Aperture value F2.0
|XA| = 1.77m(the distance between LED and cam-
era’s altitude) in Figure 3. A list of emitting angles
and distances are given in Table 5. We can see
that the emitting angle grows up observably in the
distances from 2.54m to 5.08m. It means that the
camera receives a quick drop in brightness when
the emitting angle increases.
Then, a relational graph between distance, emit-
ting angle and brightness is made with y =
1.77m(the distance between LED and camera’s al-
titude), β = 1(the constant coefficient) and |ON| =
1(the length of LED indicator in the direction of
change) in Figure 6. The figure shows that the
brightness captured by camera at a distance of 4
meters is about only 10% of the brightness at 1.77
meters.
C Comparison with OOK
When the flicker frequency is so low that the turn-
off behavior can be found with human vision, it is
natural to do something making the behavior more
indetectable. A normal way is to give a long turn-
on duration before a turn-off behavior. Then we
can encode the message before modulation like this:
Plain Bit Encoded Word
0 0
1 0 · · · 01
102 4 6 81 3 5 7 9
0
100
−20
20
40
60
80
Camera Distance (meters)
LED’s Emitting Angle
LED’s Brightness%
Figure 6: Relationship between Emitting Angle
and Brightness
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Table 4: Bit Error Rates(%) with Different Distances and Various Ambient Brightness
Brightness(LUX) 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
2.54m 0.39 15.63 0 0 0 10.16 4.30 0 16.02 5.47 1.17 8.98
3.27m 3.13 1.95 27.73 23.05 14.06 6.64 10.94 16.80 10.55 42.19 10.55 23.38
4.02m 26.17 35.55 30.08 26.17 37.89 33.20 28.13 24.61 30.08 30.86 39.84 39.84
5.08m 38.67 37.89 33.98 37.11 33.20 41.41 41.41 44.92 38.28 41.41 42.58 39.06
Table 5: Emitting Angles and Distances
Exp.1 Exp.2 Exp.3 Exp.4
Distance 2.54m 3.27m 4.02m 5.08m
Angle 38.877◦ 50.2814◦ 56.9296◦ 62.6616◦
Then the channel rate ROOK and the flicker value
fOOK can be deduced as follows.
ROOK =
2F
|Enc(1)|+ 1
, fOOK =
1
|Enc(1)|
Where, F is the flicker frequency, Enc(1) is the
length of encoded word of the bit one.
Meanwhile, the channel rate RB-FSK and the
flicker value fB-FSK with f0 = 0 can be deduced
as follows.
RB-FSK = f1, fB-FSK =
1
2F
f1
− 0.5
A comparison of flicker values is given in Fig-
ure 7 with F = 25 as same as Sepetnitsky’s
propotype[23]. The figure shows that the flicker
value with B-FSK is always lower than those with
OOK.
V Countermeasures
The countermeasures can be divided into two types:
procedural countermeasures and technical counter-
measures.
Procedural countermeasures involve banning
cameras from the office, covering the LEDs, cut-
ting off the LEDs’ feet and shielding windows. Any
banning policy needs a supervision all the time to
insure no exception. Covering the LEDs or cutting
off the feet of LEDs is easy to utilized, but it makes
users inconvenient without any indication. In ad-
dition, armored glass is used as walls in many office
space. So a surveillance camera can also received
optical signal through glass of the windows or wall.
It is necessary to shield them availably.
102 4 6 8 12 14 16 18
0
0.2
0.4
0.1
0.3
0.5
Channel Rate
Fl
ic
ke
r V
al
ue
OOK
B−FSK
Figure 7: Flicker Values Comparison between B-
FSK and OOK
Technical countermeasures involve LED status
monitoring with software or optical methods, LED
status confusing with software. Detecting the mal-
ware is a common job to security software. Then a
watchdog for the status of LEDs can find the abuses
on them. As a cost, CPU resources would be oc-
cupied to slow down the OS. Detecting the abuse
of LEDs by an outside sensor is a perfect method
without giving any information to the attacker. It
always obtains a high percentage of success if the
hardware meets the conditions. But the existence
of a covert channel is a low probability event. So
it is still difficult to detect. We notice that there
is only one covert channel that can be established
in same time. So we can confuse the LED status
actively to hold back the real risk.
The list of all countermeasures is summarized in
Table 6.
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Table 6: Cost and Effect of Countermeasures
Countermeasure Type Cost Effect shortcomings
Banning cameras from the office Proc. High Good Need for supervision
Covering the LEDs Proc. Low Good Inconvenience to user
Cutting off the LEDs’ feet Proc. Low Good Inconvenience to user
Shielding windows Proc. High Good Change surrounding brightness
Status monitoring with software Tech. Low Good Occupy CPU resources
Status monitoring with optical methods Tech. High Normal Difficult to detect
Status confusing with software Tech. Low Good Occupy CPU resources
VI Conclusions
A novel form of signal modulation with the fix sta-
tus LED indicator to build an optical covert chan-
nel was proposed in this paper. By using this mod-
ulation form, a LED indicator in Type I can leak
covert signal with a good covertness on human vi-
sion. An attack model, KLONC, was given to build
a covert communication with a purchasable gener-
ally configured IP camera by programming C codes
to turn the LED on/off. Furthermore, the mod-
ulation form and the corresponding demodulation
method were designed and optimized. Then the ef-
ficiency and covertness were estimated. The upper
bound of effective distance of KLONC was obtained
with both theoretical calculation and experimental
observation. Finally, countermeasures were given
by considering the necessary conditions of existence
of this kind of covert channel.
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